Poetry as Means of Dialogue in Court Spaces by Kinsella, John
As one dedicated to ‘openness’ in public architecture, I see courts as places of communi-
cation and exchange more than as places of control. I have written on surveillance (includ-
ing an experimental novel Genre, a three-hundred-and-thirty-page paragraph that exposes/
explores/watches the simultaneous goings-on in eight flats in a suburban block). I am all for
reducing surveillance rather than increasing it. Court buildings, when designed well, attempt
to welcome people, and to incline them towards treating each other ‘justly’. (As an aside,
I think Melbourne’s Federal Court as part of the new Commonwealth Law Courts building
at the corner of William and Latrobe Streets is particularly interesting with its use of light,
and even constitutional textuality as art and a form of ‘justification’.) I feel that poetry is his-
torically and traditionally, most often, a means of ‘just’ communication. Philosopher and
sociologist Theodor Adorno’s question regarding writing poetry after the horror of the Holo-
caust is vital here, as are poet Paul Celan’s confrontations with the erosions of the German
language through/after the Holocaust. By extension, the genocides and abuses of indigenous
Australian peoples need to be healed and reflected in the language of our courts—especially
through art and song/poetry.
I’ve always thought ‘court talk’ is poetic at its best, and that we should work collectively
toward valuing it as poetry, as I will explain shortly. Poetry can be extremely inclusive, and
a court house with poetry literally on the walls (and as part of the walls) or displayed in other
ways (sound sculptures, free standing pieces), and certainly as a poetics of architecture
(we might use Bachelard’s ‘poetics of space’ as one of many points of departure here) is one
that welcomes people to dialogue, and also reflect (and inflect) internally. To my mind, such
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a process helps make ‘justice’. Lead by example rather than simply fix the problems: it’s the
recognition of the private within the public.
From a practical viewpoint, there are a number of ways poetry might literally be intro-
duced to a court setting. One way is in the original architectural design and construction
of the court space—the building itself shaped with a consciousness of the tools and devices
of poetry (metaphor, simile and so on)—that is, interpretive elements in design—or literally
shaped about the ‘message’ in a poem. One could make an argument for the poetical func-
tionality of most buildings via poetry … On a more approachable level, poems might be tiled
into walls, stained or marked into or onto glass, be encased in a transparent medium, shaped
as free-standing sculptures, held as recordings activated by panel, pressure pad, switch, or
even voice. These approaches could equally apply to a pre-existing building, with some work,
as well. On the most basic level, poems might be hung framed: as is my poem ‘The Swan
River Viewed from a Court Balcony’. This poem was written near where it now resides (in
the judges’ chambers of the Federal Court in the Commonwealth Law Buildings on Victoria
Street, Perth), and speaks to those making judgements (in the chambers), rather than
those attending the court to be judged. I’d like to think the poem speaks across both spaces.
Of course, it’s easier to speak to the legal profession than to those being tried, where poetry
has the same ability to violate rights as any other text—and to influence juries, I’d expect.
Positioning these pieces is vital. It wouldn’t work in the courtroom, but it would work in the
waiting areas and public spaces.
The public space of a court is a crossover zone where the real after-effects (and pre-effects)
of ‘Justice’ are felt. Courts are active liminal zones. There’s a poem by Nyoongah poet, Lloyd
Riley, entitled ‘Supreme Court Gardens’, that encapsulates a lot of the contradictions between
the loss of one law and its usurpation by another, the occupation/colonisation of physical
space, and the codes of the land being covered and substituted by new codes (urban gardens).
The gardens of a court (and its public spaces in general), or those in its locale or bearing
its name, become complicit in a greater dialogue on which law is the right law, and whether
mere presence of building and landscaping denotes authority (it doesn’t). This poem (I
will show only a few stanzas) shows the power of the dreaming, the power of the imagin-
ation to transcend the urban, the building over the traditional, to literally reconnect with
what is still ‘deep, deep’ down (by extension, the traditional law and way of living):
What do dreams do? Is it a twilight zone?
Is there a doorway we all pass through,
Not knowing what’s on the other side?
One Nyoongah came back then disappeared.
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He’s in the other world, not dead!
Living here with urbanisation, yet
Living faraway, deep, deep down,
Down behind those mournful eyes,
And above that empty laugh.
Above the gentle blue skies
Below the concrete and the tar
Living beyond the touch of ‘progress’
And away from the snarling jaws of
Civilisation.1
It seems essential to me that if there is to be any reconciliation in Australia between indi-
genous peoples and migrant Australians (all other Australians), it needs to start with the
court buildings themselves, and, obviously, the law. The oral and written poetry of indige-
nous Australian poets is constantly concerned with law, and justice, and should be incor-
porated into all legal buildings in consultation with the traditional owners of the land.
The centralisation of different kinds of courts creates different possibilities for cross-genre,
or blurring, and means that a consciousness of shared space creates not only physical proxi-
mity, but allows for a crossover in language. Specificity and application might be diluted or
lost in this transfer, but certainly a more humane possibility arises in the conceptual (at least)
sharing of languages. On the other hand, the single edifice (a building or court, or, say,
two kinds of court) produces a different dialogue, and different semiotic weighting. There
are generic things we might write or say about courts, and there are case-specific things.
I have done both (from poems for Federal Court buildings to poems against state execution,
which, while court-specific, have larger implications across all aspects and buildings in the
legal system).
Though there’s been much written on the relationship between poets and the law, there
has not been a great deal written about the inclusion of poems and poetic texts in the design
and building of court spaces. As a subscriber to ‘natural law’—and one often politically scepti-
cal of the legislative and executive motives for implementations of particular laws, and the
nature of potential punishments attached to applying those laws—I feel it desirable, in many
ways, for there to be a complete absence of legal machinery. However, I am in many ways a
pragmatist, and feel that rather than functioning as vehicles for depriving individuals and
groups of freedom and liberty for their transgressions, courts might serve as places of dialogue
on the nature of these transgressions, and the appropriate way of dealing with them. For the
purposes of this essay, I am not pursuing issues of the rule of law and separation of powers;
suffice it to say that I am arguing for a ‘metaphoric’ or ‘figurative’ dialogue, rather than a legal,
logical, ‘realistic’ or specific one.
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In his innovative and insightful work, The Wallace Stevens Case: Law and the Practice of
Poetry,2 Thomas C. Grey, who is Nelson Bowman Sweitzer and Marie B. Sweitzer Professor
of Law at the Stanford Law School, discusses Stevens’s poem ‘The Motive for Metaphor’,
which Grey heard read at a ‘Law and the Humanities’ symposium. The poem concluded the
symposium, during which Margaret Jane Radin proffered a ‘pragmatist’ view of the place
of law—an alternative to ‘scientific and humanistic models of law’: ‘The pragmatist, she sug-
gested, sees law as practice, as institutionalised action in problematic situations—a view that
requires an oscillation between perspectives.’ From my point of view, this serves as a partially
useful definition of my own position. Returning to the poet Wallace Stevens, one must remem-
ber that he was a lawyer/insurance executive as well as a poet, and as Grey notes, certainly
early in Stevens’s life:
The law and its prose were separate from poetry, and supplied a form of relief for Stevens
by way of contrast with poetry … the priority was clear: imagination, poetry, and secrecy,
pursued after hours, were primary, good in themselves; reason, prose, and clarity, indulged
in during working hours, were secondary and instrumental.3
The poem that so fascinated Grey at the end of the conference, ‘The Motive for Metaphor’,
finishes with the following stanza, which becomes a focus for Grey in his analysis of poetic
intent and legal influence and commentary:
The ruddy temper, the hammer
Of red and blue, the hard sound—
Steel against intimation—the sharp flash,
The vital, arrogant, fatal, dominant X.
In his legalistic-metaphoric reading of the poem, Grey says:
The motive for metaphor, in this secondary legal version of the poem, is thus not the evasion
of the law’s hard realities, but rather the revelation of two of the most basic of those realities:
the inability of law’s language to encompass the world it would regulate; and the inescapable
link between language and feeling in establishing the hold over opinion that distinguishes
law from brute physical coercion.4
From this statement, we work our way to:
What does the lawyer gain by learning this from poetic intimation rather than prose state-
ment? Here is one possible answer, to be tested against the reader’s experience with ‘The
Motive for Metaphor’. The exercise of working through to both sides of the poem’s antithesis,
with the intelligence resisted and the feelings involved at each step, may better simulate,
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hence better teach, the exercise of legal judgement in a live dispute than could following
any set of arguments in analytic prose. (This may be so even if one of the lessons is restraint
of emotional response.)5
The last stanza of the poem emphasises the slippage in the imposition of order (steel, violent,
brutal) against the intimated, the imagined. In this reading, it becomes a tale of two cultures,
though clearly it’s not: the slippage takes the reader into the tension and ambiguity behind
specifics and possibilities. And if I might extemporise: a court in which there is never doubt
is a dangerous court, a court that has lost its humanity. Taking it one step further, though
error is the least desirable outcome of the court (… the executive might well be happy
with any error that suits its purpose, and maybe elements of the judiciary itself), the error
that errs towards caution in condemning (someone let off for a crime they have committed)
is its most ‘intimated’ and humanised and metaphoric gesture.
I will leave Grey with his concluding paragraph of the ‘Steel against Intimation’ chapter:
‘Steel against intimation’ then juxtaposes two aspects of law: its sharp rigidity, which main-
tains order and dominance, sometimes fatally; and its flexibility before the imagination,
which maintains vitality but tempts its servants to arrogant self-assertion. These correspond
to the two relations between poetry and law portrayed in the poem as a whole: they are
separate spheres; they are intertwining webs.6
A point of departure. For me, the genre boundaries between poetry and prose have always
been blurred. As William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge pointed out in their 1802
‘Preface to the Lyrical Ballads’:
it would be a most easy task to prove to him [i.e. the critic], that not only the language of
a large portion of every good poem, even of the most elevated character, must necessarily,
except with reference to the metre, in no respect differ from that of good prose, but likewise
that some of the most interesting parts of the best poems will be found to be strictly the
language of prose, when prose is well written.
I would argue that the language of courts, seeking to be the most precise form of language,
is in fact one of the most poetic. When the layperson in court gets lost in legalese, it’s not
simply a case of losing track of the logic as clause breaks into sub-clause, but that, heard as
a whole, it becomes a blur—too much information to follow without close study. Mishear-
ings and misprisions create a poetic distraction, a figurative language that moves to its
own rhythms, creating a metaphoric slippage in which missing a disclaimer or caveat might
lead one to interpreting the text as meaning its opposite. This is a crude reduction, but the
point about loss of meaning is a common complaint. Of course, a piece of law that has been
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tested in different contexts is not necessarily fixed, and precedent cases or challenges
mean that language evolves, is added to, even deleted. This adds to the confusion—a mis-
understanding regarding the organic nature of textual (written) law in particular.
In his chapter ‘Writing, Law, and Legal Practice in the Athenian Courts’, David Cohen
quotes Demosthenes from Against Meidias:7
And what is the strength of the laws? If one of you is wronged and cries aloud will the
laws run up and stand at his side to defend him? No. They are written texts (grammata
gegrammena) and incapable of such action. In what, then, resides their power? In you, if
you support them and make them effective whenever anyone asks. So the laws are strong
through you and you through the laws.8
Cohen has already differentiated between the written and ‘unwritten, unchanging, time-
less divine laws’ at the beginning of the chapter, and is here emphasising ‘the mutable, man-
made, instrumental quality of law’.
This is an issue of prose and poetry for me. As an anarchist, I am not against a rule of law—
I differ on how laws are made, why they are made, and how they are applied, but am not
against their existence. I work small-scale rather than large-scale, and feel that most people
know the difference between the right way to behave towards each other (and the world at
large) and the wrong way. Now, that’s a subjective issue of choice, but where there’s an argu-
ment to be made regarding language is in Demosthenes, ‘So the laws are strong through you
and you through the laws’. True, but not if the meaning of the (written) laws escape you. Not
if you have had no training or experience in understanding them. Is this a case for simpli-
city: fewer laws expressed in the simplest language? Clearly impossible, at least in the con-
text of the modern nation state. Then what? The space where poetry and prose blur: people
might better understand through the antithetical, the ambiguous, the metaphoric. In a prac-
tical sense, discuss the language of law differently, in a pragmatic sense, overtly introduce
poverty to the court buildings. Poetry and prose as one.
I argue that the language of the courts is both metonymic and metaphoric. Here’s a
common legal synecdoche—that is, a kind of metonym in which a part stands for the whole:
The Crown standing for the monarchy, or The Bench standing for the court and its powers
as a whole. General examples worth considering in court language might be in the naming
of crimes, such as (the British) ‘going equipped’, meaning the person has been found carry-
ing potential tools of the burglar’s trade but has not necessarily committed a burglary. This
has characteristics of metonym but also ironic metaphor. Another blurred example is the
term ‘housebreaking’, which includes both metonymic and metaphoric aspects. Much
contemporary poetry in English (and other languages) makes extensive use of metonym,
in addition to the more traditional metaphor.
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Here’s a poem by Dylan Thomas that ‘plays’ with these linguistic devices and manners
of expression for moral and ‘just’ purpose. Thematically, the poem also deals with issues of
‘law’—it examines the alienation between cause and effect by considering the ever-widening
gap between those who make and implement law (the hand that signs) and its effects/
implications (on those who receive it). In this metonymic and metaphoric poem, we learn
all that hands do: sign, fell, tax, do … to death, hold dominion, count, not soften, stroke, rule:
The Hand that Signed the Paper
The hand that signed the paper felled a city;
Five sovereign fingers taxed the breath,
Doubled the globe of dead and halved a country;
These five kings did a king to death.
The mighty hand leads to a sloping shoulder,
The finger joints are cramped with chalk;
A goose’s quill has put an end to murder
That put an end to talk.
The hand that signed the treaty bred a fever,
And famine grew, and locusts came;
Great is the hand that holds dominion over
Man by a scribbled name.
The five kings count the dead but do not soften
The crusted wound nor stroke the brow;
A hand rules pity as a hand rules heaven;
Hands have no tears to flow.
(1936)
The rendering of court language into poetry (and vice versa, for that matter!) becomes
neither difficult nor outside familiar modern reading practices. So much of the courts’
duty is in listing and collating detail about specific crimes—the type of object/s stolen, for
example, their value, the specifics of the item (if a shoe, it might be size, materials used in
its manufacture, type of sole etc.), the brand names and the import of these, and so on.
The accumulation of evidence is vital to the presentation of a case, but though a trial might
turn on a very specific piece of evidence, the overall issues of wrong and right are broader,
more generic. It’s a mixture of the exact and the subjective. So too with a poem—some poems
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work entirely through accumulation of close-up detail, others speak in cliches and general-
isations. When we’ve read a poem we usually get a sense of a generic theme or mood: death,
life, love, conflict, harmony, and so on.
Terms of address and ways of listing are overtly poetic. Whether law from the Bible or
Koran or other religious text, the secular variation isn’t often that far away. The secular court
still has its roots in the religious. For some, the de-spiritualising of the court means a non-
recognition of that court. Poetry is a way of bridging this gap. In my edition of the Koran,
the commentary points out that the majesty of the poetry of the Koran (even when it is
laying down the law with great specificity), meant whole eras when the Koran’s poetry became
the entire poetry of communities because it was so effective, meeting literal and figurative
needs. I am not suggesting secular courts should become religious (I am an anarchist, remem-
ber), but I am suggesting there’s room for dialogue there.
I’d like to look at three examples of poetry I have written designed for use in courts. Those
on trial have not infrequently read poems aloud in courts, and that is another function of
poetry, but I am talking specifically of the poet writing from ‘outside’ (though I have also
been ‘inside’!), for decorative (if political) purpose. As installation and intervention. The
poems I am discussing were written about the space, but also designed to be displayed there.
In the first case, this became a reality after a judge read the poem, in the second I wrote it
specifically for the purpose. In the third, I wrote a series of poems to encourage people to
stop an execution, and having failed to do this, would like to see the poem built into the fabric
of court buildings as a reminder of the negations, contradictions, and implications of the
death sentence.
In each of the poems I have written for courts, devices from metaphor to synecdoche
are at work, as well as the genre blurring and ‘message’. The ‘mixture’ of technical approach,
and the choice between open and closed verse forms is vital: the tensions and relaxations
that dialogue within the poems seek to replicate something of the to-and-fro of presentation,
cross-examination, and summing-up of the courts themselves.
The poems have come about circumstantially on one level, and by overt intent on another.
I have, in the last few years, written two pieces for Federal Court spaces—in Perth and
Melbourne. Both are in ‘open’ forms. The first poem, the Perth Federal Court Poem, is about
what makes law, about its social implications, about the loss or replacement of others’ law,
and about obligations to protect not only the rights of people, but the rights of the environ-
ment, animals, and place. The river is used as a metaphor and symbol of law and connection.
It is the thread that makes sense of cause and effect: of decisions and their consequences.
It was written looking out from a place of dialogue, hoping to extend that dialogue. It was
written looking out from a place of restitution and hope, and a place where hope might
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equally be lost or destroyed. The river suffers a similar fate. It calls for a holism and a respect
for those who lose as much as those who gain. The use of ‘pollution’ is heroic Greek as much
as literal.
The Swan River Viewed from a Court Balcony
What flow passes the vista
of a federal court,
pauses in surface tension,
the band of green
that makes a foreshore?
Blocked out, top-dressed
for rally drivers,
but still an official airstrip,
that might be redesigned
to influence the light—growth,
sculpture, running water,
to give back when the fad’s
to take, to grow out
into what now amounts
to a lake connected to a river
at either end; from this balcony garden,
this judge’s bench floating
or squatting over the courts,
that cast down or lift up
or just ask to be heard,
a social conscience
that might be the flow of water,
of information, of language kept
in check and saying exactly what it means.
It’s a framework too, it’s a molar
composition, the molecules settling
against the banks, swarming
about the jetties. The spray,
the drifts, the currents and tides
inform a judgement: the random path
of particles cannot be forgotten:
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we’re in there, like it or not,
breathing the same air,
the same water.
It’s pollution
we want to keep out,
but metaphors and symbols
don’t always bridge the gap: people
are not algae, and the blooms
that choke the river
find no place in the language of beauty:
the liminal can be exact,
and when we forget that
people are wrongly imprisoned,
and justice wallows in the drying
riverbed. A kingfish moves
rapidly upriver, avoiding bait
and pollutants; it sets a precedent,
as if it co-exists with the city,
the river’s traffic, the language
obscured by development,
any number of histories.
We might imagine
its arguments.
Summing up …
the water forms
a painting: as temporal as we
make it, its laws mouthed
through sediment. Curators,
we sail against the light
and forget, until something
makes us look back.
From up here, the river sits,
its stilled points
holes in the text.
The second poem I wrote from inside out—from a Federal Court building looking out—
was in Melbourne, in 2004. The Swan River poem was dedicated to Justice Nicholson, with
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whom I have enjoyed many long conversations about the nature of law and justice, and with
whose hospitality I was allowed onto the court’s balcony. In the second case, accompanied
by Justice Nicholson, I was introduced to Chief Justice Black, who kindly showed me his
chambers and the court in general. I was excited by its poetics: in general design, but also
in the use of text-in-glass. The poem I responded with is about the nature of the court itself:
specifically the federal court, and the nature of ‘Australia’. It’s also a poem that works with
the discussion I had with Justice Black about the permanence (and impermanence) of law,
and how and why notions of justice might change. The stone of the building becomes the
obvious symbol of longevity, reliability, even permanence, but it’s the view that changes, the
lines of the map that do liminal double-duty as permanent yet constantly changing (even
where change is slow, as in a desert landscape looking a long, long way outwards). For me,
it was the light of the building that gave hope for dialogue: as in jails, light should never be
denied. It is as important as food or shelter. To deny it is a crime as great as any. In this
new building, light reached into and around chambers, points of viewing in and out were
provided, even the courtrooms experienced the enlightenments of angled and abundant
light. The city (and the gardens/park over the road) became part of the interiority of the
space/s. The court becomes a place of liberty, release, and thus justice. Hope is, in design
at least, fed, despite the contradictions of colonisation, occupation, and displacement that
a court building will inevitably also represent and symbolise. It’s the recognition that justice
is positioned looking in and out of the pragmatic space as much as any other.
View Turned Inside Out from the Federal Court in Melbourne
for Chief Justice Black
You say ‘up the Centre to the Gulf,
that’s where Burke and Wills went’,
and our view augments the possibility
of the mind’s eye taking us away—
the stone these laws are set in
changes with heat and cold,
with the lie of the land,
the flow of river
and the deepening clouds
of interior, intensity
of rainforests, textual ripples
of wheat crops, ochre and primary
against the red sky of stories,
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parables—the echoes’ timbre
a variety of stone, this building’s
plateaus and chamber, edifices
and rills, tablelands and highlands,
caves and cliffs facing broad oceans,
climatic interface and translation; to add,
and ‘across into Australia Felix’,
the emanations of Yarra
weaving its suspending waters,
hoists, chains, trucks, forklifts shaking the docks,
Mount Macedon … places to get your
bearings by, places you rely on.
Working the containers,
stevedores know as well these
fulcrums, and their gateways
opening out beyond satellite navigations,
the type of product they load and unload,
the routes the crow flies inland; to reassure
the sentinel balance, Mount Dandenong,
where my partner’s people
congregate, out of Ireland
and the goldfields,
entranced by the lustre
of good fortune, a semi-vision
half-remembered in the wavering
light between us; this balcony
that holds us like justice
wrought from light, illuminating,
exposing those who’d
refuse to listen … we crave
light and access. Threefold
the leaves of glass
filter light and history: legislature,
executive, judiciary … the architect’s
veil of words, or all we expect
looking up at edges
of letters testing opacity, processing
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aspiration without tension
as if the flow of the river
were never in doubt,
its visibility
unravelling smoke-stacks
and ships, the bleakest cases …
The green light of the park infuses,
hints at early darkness …
a chevron mirror
turns the court inside out,
the spinal cord so sensitive,
waterholes and campfires
marked in every seat,
faintly overheard
by those not listening
to the explorer’s laws
of stone, bush, and lineless maps,
the songs of light
there before them,
tracks mapped out
between the camps.
Over the years I have written a number of ‘protest’ poems about state execution, to which
I am deeply opposed. To be effective as poetry, however, these works utilise slippage and
metaphor, and invite the reader (or listener) into dialogue or conversation with the poem.
Most recently, I wrote a series of poems for Van Nguyen, hoping to help stave off his execution.
These poems were written to anyone who might listen, but most specifically they were written
to the idea of the court in Singapore, and very much the building itself: that is, where the
law was interpreted and applied. The city becomes a metaphor for the court itself, which
is not to hold all responsible for the outcome, but to remind us all that we all have a voice
and place in the application and preservation of justice. I consider myself part of justice, and
culpable when it is wrongly applied—wherever that might be, allowing for cultural sensi-
tivities, but still maintaining the right to life for everyone everywhere. The court building
should be a passive defence against violence in any form, to my mind. When the violent
go there to be tried, they should be prevented from making violence, and receiving it! If not,
it’s hypocrisy, I feel.
The form of a poem matters greatly to how it might be read. The following poems are
written in strict traditional ‘closed’ forms (though I try to innovate within these parameters,
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as I wish to offer an alternative to the ‘law’ as it exists in the context), and those forms become
cultural/intercultural connectors, signs of respect (across cultures), so as to attempt not to
disrespect another people’s laws and values: I will engage as much as I can on ‘your’ terms.
That is, not to create an Us and Them situation (in the example of the Van Nguyen case,
many Singaporeans felt Australians had a purely nationalistic, primarily economic and even
racist agenda in taking a sudden interest in this case, as opposed to others). At one stage, a
journalist from the Straits Times approached me to do a feature on the poems and campaign
(days before the execution), but was vetoed by the editor. I sent the poems to the Straits
Times, to The Australian newspaper (which never responded in any way), and to a Singaporean
literary journal and discussion board, which did publish them instantly. My hope is that
these poems find their way onto court building walls, as reminders of our obligations. Here
are a few of them:
Grace: a plea for the life of Van Nguyen
The humidity is increasing here,
and stretched taut through a time zone
we share, there is no argument of nation,
but rather a simple equation
of what’s done between sunrise
and sunset—our washing, our eating, our prayers.
In taking a breath that feeds the air
with embodiment, we gasp,
struggle to fill our lungs,
struggle to fill our days
awaiting the sleep we will wake from:
fresh, contrite, enlightened.
Doina: another plea for the life of Van Nguyen
The serrated fronds of palms waver at the airport;
The condemned is cut off from flight.
The ripe durian fruit is sweetest eaten when the smell’s offensive;
The condemned eats, is killed, the bitter-sweet unbalances.
The flowering strands of rice exhale inflorescence;
The executioner eats a meal—before, and after.
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Lightning—a fifth plea for the life of Van Nguyen
We observe night places
so intensely
when rips
of lightning
underscore:
though we look
harder for it,
harder
at the ragged edges
of rock and foliage
levelling apostasy?
The storm ranging
through the valley,
still the smell
of cut oat-stalks:
so brittle
earlier in the day,
broken open
to fuel violence
everywhere
around us.
Preservation Haiku—sixth plea for the life of Van Nguyen
Elevated birds;
Plants photosynthesising;
No execution.
We celebrate birth
To enrich the biosphere;
No execution.
Eyes preserve distance;
Up close makes large of the small;
No execution.
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The grime wasn’t there;
Rain over the window pane;
No execution.
The boat cuts water;
Its wake is soon forgotten.
No execution.
The curved horizon;
The intactness of island.
No execution.
Ghazal—seventh plea for the life of Van Nguyen
Buoyed by rain in the volatile forest, it’s our loss.
Forget the risk of fire and take your rest? It’s our loss.
Children in my daughter’s class will celebrate a birthday.
All consequences as they feather their nest. It’s our loss.
She wants to go but feels she shouldn’t. It’s her conscience.
Whatever she does we’ll support her. A test? It’s our loss.
On the coastal plane it was raining less—people barely noticed.
Though noticing it wasn’t as hot, felt blessed. It’s our loss.
I watched the ornamental fish swim golden in soda-blue water.
Surfacing as one, I heard their request. It’s our loss.
You’d stand alone, John, and make your statement?
All of us lose a fragment. The State confessed? It’s our loss.
Darkness—ninth plea for the life of Van Nguyen
I walked through darkness this evening
but it wasn’t darkness at all—
there was no resistance,
no pushing back.
I imagined the river
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flowing nearby—fiercely close
gatherer of tributaries.
I could sense the movement of fish
through oily water,
I could hear movement of light
on the bank distantly opposite—
but there was no resistance,
no pushing back;
it not being darkness at all.
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